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Abstract. Long after its alleged demise, phlogiston was still presented, discussed and defended
by leading chemists. Even some of the leading proponents of the new chemistry admitted its
‘absolute existence’. We demonstrate that what was defended under the title ‘phlogiston’ was
no longer a particular hypothesis about combustion and respiration. Rather, it was a set of
ontological and epistemological assumptions and the empirical practices associated with them.
Lavoisier’s gravimetric reduction, in the eyes of the phlogistians, annihilated the autonomy of
chemistry together with its peculiar concepts of chemical substance and quality, chemical
process and chemical afﬁnity. The defence of phlogiston was the defence of a distinctly chemical
conception of matter and its appearances, a conception which reﬂected the chemist’s
acquaintance with details and particularities of substances, properties and processes and his
skills of adducing causal relations from the interplay between their complexity and uniformity.
Introduction: the ‘absolute existence’ of phlogiston
Though the late experiments demonstrate that phlogiston does not give weight or heaviness
to metals, that phlogiston does not disengage itself from the sulphur during formation of
the sulphuric acid; yet we still allow the absolute existence of a phlogiston. It is still the
matter of ﬁre, of ﬂame, of light, and of heat which is liberated in combustion; the only
difference is, that we do not agree with Stahl, that this principle disengages from the body in
combustion . . . [we believe] that it is liberated from the vital air on the precipitation of the
oxygen. Yet it is still phlogiston with its most distinguishing attributes. In short, it is still the
matter of heat; whether we call it phlogiston, caloric, or in plain English, ﬁre.1
The author of this paragraph, James St John, was anything but a militant advocate of
phlogiston theory. In fact, as Crosland puts it, he was ‘convinced of the superiority of the
oxygen theory and the new nomenclature’,2 and in this passage of 1788 he was prefacing
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1 Claude-Louis Berthollet, Antoine François de Fourcroy and Louis-Bernard Guyton de Morveau, Method
of Chymical Nomenclature (tr. James St John), London: G. Kearsley, 1788, pp. x–xi.
2 Maurice Crosland, Historical Studies in the Language of Chemistry, New York: Dover, 1978, p. 193. On
St John and the translation of the Method see ibid., 193–196. On St John’s translation and its inﬂuence in a
wider context see also Denis I. Duveen and Herbert S. Klickstein, ‘Two broadsides illustrating Antoine Laurent
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his own English translation of the Lavoisians’ seminal Method of Chymical
Nomenclature, the work that is customarily taken to have all but concluded the
takeover by the new French chemistry. Writing only one year before the publication of
Lavoisier’s Traité élémentaire de chimie (published in English in 1790 as Elements
of Chemistry), St John grants that ‘experiments demonstrate’ that combustion and
calcination processes cannot be accounted for in traditional phlogistic terms. Moreover,
St John’s words embed Lavoisier’s operative view of elementary constituents
(of composites) as the endpoint of chemical analysis: since phlogiston could be obtained
from neither metals nor sulphur it was not one of their constituents. Even his deﬁnition
of what phlogiston actually is – ‘the matter of ﬁre, of ﬂame, of light, and of heat which is
liberated in combustion’ – could have just as easily been captured under Lavoisier’s new
term ‘caloric’. Yet St John insists on the need to ‘still allow [for] the absolute existence of
a phlogiston’.
Why? What did St John ﬁnd amiss in the chemistry he was presenting to the English
reader that required clinging to the existence of an entity whose elimination was one of
its main aims and achievements? Perhaps the most surprising, hence most telling, aspect
of St John’s remark was this insistence on the ‘absolute existence’ of phlogiston over and
above the hypothetical properties that gave this entity its theoretical import and
sustained it for the better part of the eighteenth century. Found in the preface to the
Method this is all the more striking, since one of the core motivations of this work was to
assure that each chemical term connoted the precise composition of the substance it
denoted. This, Lavoisier boasted, meant that
we have so well succeeded that by a single word, it is instantly evident what is the combustible
substance entering into any composition; if that combustible substance is combined with
the acidifying principle, and in what proportion; in what state the acid is, and to what basis
united; if there is a perfect or exact saturation; and if it is the acid or if it is the basis which is in
excess.3
The lack of such analytical precision was one of Lavoisier’s main allegations against
phlogiston and phlogistic chemistry. A decade earlier, in his memoir Réﬂexions sur le
phlogistique (1777), Lavoisier famously framed phlogiston as a ‘vague principle, lacking
a rigorous deﬁnition, and which is, consequently, adaptable to all explanations . . . It is a
veritable Proteus that changes its form at each instance’.4
Lavoisier’s “Chemical characters adapted to the new nomenclature”’, Proceedings of the American
Philosophical Society (1954) 98, pp. 466–468; idem, ‘The introduction of Lavoisier’s nomenclature into
America’, Isis (1954) 45, pp. 278–292.
3 Berthollet, Fourcroy and Morveau, op. cit. (1), p. 16.
4 The passage reads: ‘les chimistes ont fait du phlogistique un principe vague qui n’est point rigoureusement
déﬁni, et qui, par conséquent, s’adapte à toutes les explications dans lesquelles on veut le faire entrer; tantôt ce
principe est pesant, et tantôt il ne l’est pas; tantôt il est le feu libre, tantôt il est le feu combiné avec l’élément
terreux ; tantôt il passe à travers les pores des vaisseaux, tantôt ils sont impénétrables pour lui; il explique à la
fois la causticité et la non-causticité, la diaphanéité et l’opacité, les couleurs et l’absence des couleurs. C’est un
véritable Protée qui change de forme à chaque instant’. Antione Laurent Lavoisier, Oeuvres de Lavoisier,
6 vols., Paris, 1862–1893, vol. 2, p. 640.
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The claim that ‘it is still phlogiston’ was not peculiar to St John or to the English-
speaking parts of the world of chemistry. Antoine François Fourcroy, one of the
co-authors of the Method and Lavoisier’s close collaborator, expressed a similar
sentiment:
the matter of ﬁre or of heat, which Mr. Lavoisier admits in pure air, whose disengagement is
supposed by him to be the cause of the bright ﬂame in combustion, can be nothing else than the
phlogiston of Stahl . . . and that all chemists are of course agreed that it exists.5
Like St John, Fourcroy assumes that phlogiston had already been stripped of its
traditional theoretical functions and properties, but insists on its existence, which is
allegedly agreed upon by all chemists. Nor was this expression only an early hesitation
by Fourcroy or a reﬂection of his well-known slow transition into Lavoisier’s camp. In
1790 and again in 1796 he still insisted that
even that numerous train of experiments which have been of late made on combustible bodies
and combustion, have not fully demonstrated that there is no such principle as ﬁxed ﬁre in
material bodies: its existence seems to be allowed, while its name is changed; and instead of the
phlogistic, it is called the caloric, principle.6
Even staunch supporters of the ‘anti-phlogistic theory’ – a term coined by the Anglo-Irish
chemist Richard Kirwan7 – found it seemingly hard to depart from this beleaguered
entity.
Phlogiston, of course, survived long after Lavoisier’s experimentum crucis, as
even Joseph Priestley referred to the calcination of metals.8 Nor was it laid to rest
with Lavoisier’s ensuing publications, beginning with the 1775 ‘Easter memoir’
5 Antoine François de Fourcroy, Elements of Natural History, and of Chemistry, 2nd edn, vol. 1 (tr. William
Nicholson), London, 1788, p. 142.
6 Antoine François de Fourcroy, Elements of Natural History and Chemistry, 3rd edn, vol. 1, London,
1790, p. 107; idem, Elements of Chemistry, and Natural History, 4th edn, vol. 1, London, 1796, p. 108.
7 Richard Kirwan, An Essay on Phlogiston, and the Constitution of Acids (tr. William Nicolson and Mme
Lavoisier), London, 1789, p. 7. Kirwan’s Essay deﬁnes to a large extent the communities involved in what we
term the ‘late defence of phlogiston’. Kirwan ﬁrst introduced his theory of phlogiston as inﬂammable air as a
reaction to the phlogistic outlook of Carl Scheele and published it as an appended commentary to the 1780
edition of Scheele’s Treatise on Air and Fire (the English translation of the 1779 Chemische Abhandlung von
der Luft und dem Feuer) for which Bergman provided a lengthy introduction. In his commentary, Kirwan paid
extensive tribute to Priestley (who also attached a letter to this edition), who in the early 1780s adopted
Kirwan’s theory of phlogiston. The Lavoisians paid close attention to Kirwan’s work on phlogiston. The Essay
was translated by Mme Lavoisier into French in 1788 and published with careful comments by Lavoisier,
Fourcroy, Berthollet, Morveau and others, and then translated back into English by Nicholson and published
‘With Additional Remarks and Replies, by the Author’ as the 1789 edition. Throughout the 1790s, Priestley,
attempting to re-establish phlogiston as a theoretical option, referred in his writings to ‘the surviving answerers
of Mr. Kirwan’ (Joseph Priestley, Considerations on the Doctrine of Phlogiston and the Decomposition of
Water, Philadelphia: Thomas Dobson, 1796) – those of the group who had survived Lavoisier’s execution in
1794.
8 Joseph Priestley, Experiments and Observations on Different Kinds of Air, 2nd edn, London: J. Johnson,
1775, p. 133. See Stephen Toulmin, ‘Crucial experiments: Priestley and Lavoisier’, Journal of the History of
Ideas (1957) 18, pp. 205–220. The decomposition and synthesis of water was another instance of a ‘crucial’
experiment in the Chemical Revolution.
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and culminating with the 1789 Traité.9 ‘Phlogistians’, to use Kirwan’s terminology
again – those still working and reasoning within phlogistic frameworks after Lavoisier’s
memoir – could convincingly claim that although the nature and existence of phlogiston
were in question, they were not more questionable than the nature and existence of the
new theoretical entities proposed in its stead. How was phlogiston inferior to Fourcroy’s
‘matter of ﬁre or of heat’, or to St John’s ‘matter of ﬁre, of ﬂame, of light, and of heat’?
Lavoisier himself professed openly in the Traité his lack of a theoretical grasp of the
nature of caloric, or that of light, as well as the relationship between the two, conceding
‘the existence of this ﬂuid to be hypothetical’ and admitting that ‘we are not obliged
to suppose [caloric] to be a real substance’.10 In his 1792 First Principles of Chemistry,
William Nicholson could therefore package old and new entities together in a sceptical
remark: ‘the existence of heat, light, and phlogiston, as chemical principles of bodies, is
not yet incontrovertibly established’.11 Phlogiston survived also on its own: in the 1780
Treatise on Air and Fire, Scheele reasoned exclusively within a phlogistic framework
and dedicated an entry to phlogiston.12 Bergman’s ‘Table of afﬁnities’, published in
his 1785 Treatise on Elective Afﬁnities, comprised a column for phlogiston and a
lengthy entry explored its nature and chemical functions.13 In 1787 Kirwan published
his much-anticipated Essay on Phlogiston, mentioned above, in which he presented
his own phlogistic experiments and analysed Lavoisier’s experiments in phlogistic
terms. Phlogiston was also accorded an entry in the 1795 Dictionary of Chemistry of
Nicholson, the English translator of the Lavoisians’ replies to Kirwan’s Essay,14 and as
late as 1800 Fourcroy still enumerated the friends and foes of ‘the new doctrine of the
French chemists’.15 Priestley, among the foes, was to remain a lifelong vocal supporter of
the phlogistic cause.16
9 A revised version of the 1773 memoir entitled ‘Sur une nouvelle théorie de la calcination et de la réduction
des substances métalliques sur la cause de l’augmentation de poids quelles acquièrent au feu et sur différens
phénomènes qui appartiennent à l’air ﬁxe’; printed in René Fric, ‘Contribution à l’étude de l’evolution des idées
de Lavoisier sur la nature de l’air et sur la calcination des métaux’, Archives internationales d’histoire des
sciences (1959) 12, pp. 137–168, 155–162. See also Frederic L. Holmes, Antoine Lavoisier – the Next Crucial
Year or the Sources of His Quantitative Method in Chemistry, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998,
pp. 30–40; C.E. Perrin, ‘Lavoisier’s thoughts on calcination and combustion, 1772–1773’, Isis (1986) 77,
pp. 647–666.
10 Antoine Laurent Lavoisier, Elements of Chemistry (tr. Robert Kerr), Edinburgh, 1790, pp. 4–6.
11 William Nicholson, The First Principles of Chemistry, 2nd edn, London, 1792, p. 91.
12 See note 7 above for details on this publication; it was translated from the German into English by
J.R. Forster.
13 On Bergman’s work on afﬁnities, which represented the most advanced contemporary effort of its kind,
see Mi Gyung Kim, Afﬁnity, That Elusive Dream: A Genealogy of the Chemical Revolution, Cambridge, MA:
MIT press, 2003, pp. 258–69. See also J.A. Schuﬂe, Torbern Bergman: A Man before His Time, Lawrence:
Coronado, 1985; Marco Berreta, ‘T.O. Bergman and the deﬁnition of chemistry’, Lychnos (1988), pp. 37–67.
14 William Nicholson, A Dictionary of Chemistry, 2 vols., London, 1795, vol. 2, pp. 639–649.
15 Fourcroy, op. cit. (5), pp. xiv–xv.
16 See also Michael F. Conlin, ‘Joseph Priestley’s American defense of phlogiston reconsidered’, Ambix
(1996) 43, pp. 129–145; F. Verbruggen, ‘How to explain Priestley’s defense of phlogiston’, Janus (1972) 59,
pp. 47–69.
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Our present interests, however, are not in the fact that the demise of phlogiston was a
protracted process, contrary to the once common view of the Chemical Revolution. Nor
are we interested in the relative strength of the phlogistian and anti-phlogistian
arguments and especially not in the various theories of phlogiston still in play in the
1780s and beyond. It is well established that throughout the eighteenth century, and
more so toward its end, there were as many such theories as there were theoreticians,
thriving within different cultural and national traditions.17
What we will study in the following is the insistence on the ‘absolute existence’ of
phlogiston, particularly when the demise of the theories in which it featured became all
but a foregone conclusion. This insistence on existence is conspicuous especially given
the acknowledged fundamental disagreements about phlogiston’s theoretical status,
about its constitution, about its properties and even, as the words of Fourcroy and
Nicholson above suggest, about the very meaning of ‘existence’ of a chemical substance.
Increasingly defensive, the late phlogistians rarely questioned the merits of the new
theory and the experiments adduced in its support; nor did they attempt to undermine
the competence of its promulgators. What their arguments reﬂect is rather a clear sense
of loss. For phlogiston’s dwindling supporters, and even for some Lavoisians like St John
and Fourcroy, the new chemistry was evidently coming at too high a price. In exchange
for what Kirwan dubbed a ‘false shew of simplicity’, the traditional chemist was forced
to abandon ontological assumptions and epistemological mores that were essential to
what comprised the science of chemistry.18
Our paper is therefore an inquiry into what late eighteenth-century chemists reveal as
their most cherished presuppositions, when the deep changes to their discipline force
them to reﬂect on, reformulate and argue for what used to be self-evident. These
presuppositions are ontological in the sense of determining what a chemical substance is,
what are its ways of engaging with other substances and what are its relations to its
properties. They are epistemological in the sense of deﬁning the ways such a substance
was expected to present itself to experience; in dictating the criteria for successful
experiment, convincing argument and tenable theory. Yet these are not philosophical
assumptions in the sense of being elaborated in philosophical tracts or reﬂecting
17 For the variety of phlogiston theories, especially in the later part of the eighteenth century, see James
Riddick Partington and D. McKie, Historical Studies on the Phlogiston Theory, New York: Arno Press, 1981.
For phlogiston in the German context consider Karl Hufbauer, The Formation of the German Chemical
Community (1720–1795), Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982; see also Alfred Nordmann,
‘Lavoisier’s and Lichtenberg’s Enlightenments’, in Marco Beretta (ed.), Lavoisier in Perspective, Munich:
Deutsches Museum, 2005, pp. 109–128. For the French context see Kim, op. cit. (13); and Mi Gyung Kim,
‘The “instrumental” reality of phlogiston’, Hyle (2008) 14, pp. 27–51. For chemistry in the Scottish context,
with reference to heat research, see Arthur Donovan, Philosophical Chemistry in the Scottish Enlightenment,
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1975. Jan Golinski, Science as Public Culture: Chemistry and
Enlightenment in Britain, 1760–1820, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, provides a cultural
analysis of the British pneumatic tradition. For Frederic L. Holmes’s analysis of the British versions of
phlogiston theory see note 24 below. Our own interests are not in the nuances of phlogiston theory when it was
still a viable theoretical option, but in the arguments brought for retaining the existence of the substance
‘phlogiston’ when, and by those for whom, it was becoming increasingly clear that all these various theories
were no longer tenable.
18 Kirwan, op. cit. (7), p. 8.
The ‘absolute existence’ of phlogiston 5
a reasoned allegiance to a philosophical school.19 Rather, the ontology and
epistemology that the late defenders of phlogiston were trying to rescue were embedded
in the practices of producing chemical knowledge and in the criteria by which this
knowledge is assessed; they reveal themselves most prominently when these practices are
endangered and when their proponents come under threat.20 This is the reason why the
very ‘existence’ of phlogiston was defended, while the important theoretical functions it
fulﬁlled were surrendered in face of the theoretical and experimental prowess of ‘the new
system of chemistry’.21
‘Red vapours’ versus ‘absolute facts’
It was the existence of phlogiston, rather than any of its hypothetical qualities, which
was being defended. According to Nicholson, by 1792 the claim that during calcination
metals unite with ‘the vital part of the air’ ceased to be a matter of debate. All that
phlogistians still insisted upon was that this process also involved ‘phlogiston [being]
disengaged’.22 Fourcroy made a similar claim from the opposite perspective. ‘All
chemists are of course agreed’, he exclaimed, that the ‘phlogiston of Stahl . . . exists’, yet
the phlogistians are wrong in everything else they maintain about this entity:
What proves that they are not in the true road to truth, is, that each phlogistian has framed a
particular theory of his own, which has little or no relation to any other theory; so that there are
now nearly as many theories, as many different kinds of phlogiston, as there are defenders of
phlogiston.23
19 This is not to deny the signiﬁcance of such philosophical commitments. For a comprehensive study of
Priestley’s intellectual debt to Locke, Hartley and versions of materialism, utilitarianism, determinism,
Socinianism and so on, see John G. McEvoy, ‘Joseph Priestley, ‘aerial philosopher’: metaphysics and
methodology in Priestley’s chemical thought, from 1762 to 1781’, Ambix (1978) 25, pp. 1–55, 93–116,
153–175, and ibid. (1979) 26, pp. 16–38. For what has been designated the totality (or synoptic nature) of his
thought see John G. McEvoy and J.E. McGuire, ‘God and Nature: Priestley’s way of rational dissent’,
Historical Studies in Physical Sciences (1975) 6, pp. 325–404. On Lavoisier’s indebtedness to Condillac’s
philosophy of language see Lissa Roberts, ‘Condillac, Lavoisier, and the instrumentalization of science’, The
Eighteenth Century: Theory and Interpretation (1992) 33, pp. 252–271.
20 The methodological, historiographic and philosophical literature on scientiﬁc controversies is vast, much
of it within the sociology of scientiﬁc knowledge. There are important social factors in the relations between the
main ﬁgures of our account, but analysing them is beyond the scope of our argument. For a challenging study of
the social context of the chemical revolution see Jonathan Simon, Chemistry, Pharmacy and Revolution in
France, 1777–1809, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005. For a singular sociological analysis see H. Gilman McCann,
Chemistry Transformed: The Paradigmatic Shift from Phlogiston, Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1978. For a more
general perspective see Victor Boantza and Marcelo Dascal (eds.), Controversies within the Scientiﬁc
Revolution, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, forthcoming. For a philosophical analysis of the role of controversies
in the historiography of science see Ofer Gal’s contribution to that volume and his ‘Controversies over
controversies: an ontological perspective on the place of controversy in current historiography’, in Han-liang
Chang and Marcelo Dascal (eds.), Controversies: East and West, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2007,
pp. 267–280.
21 Priestley, op. cit. (8).
22 Nicholson, op. cit. (11), p. 160.
23 Fourcroy, op. cit. (5), pp. xvi–xix.
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Even Priestley, commonly considered the ‘last important defender of phlogiston’ or ‘the
most relentless opponent of the antiphlogistic theory’, did not venture to offer a distinct
concept, let alone a ‘particular theory’, of phlogiston.24 In his explicit (and very late)
attempt rekindle the phlogistic debate in 1796, he willingly conceded that the ‘phlogistic
theory is not without its difﬁculties’.25 But this theoretical frailty did not shake his
conviction that phlogiston, as a substance, exists:
In all other cases of the calcination of metals in air, which I have called the phlogistication of the
air, it is not only evident that they gain something, which adds to their weight, but that they
likewise part with something.26
‘Something’ was lost, the precise nature of which Priestley no longer ventured to deﬁne.
He was willing to accept the antiphlogistians’ crucial claim that metals absorb, ‘gain
something’, during their calcination. What he was unwilling to eschew, however, was
that they ‘likewise part with something’. Some physical, material substance must be
admitted, even if its particular import in the chemical process had changed radically.
Priestley went on to explain the necessity of this assumption:
The more simple of this [sic] processes is the exposing [of] iron to the heat of a burning lens in
conﬁned air, in consequence of which the air is diminished, and the iron becomes a calx. But
that there is something emitted from the iron in this process is evident from the strong smell
which arises from it . . . and this is the substance, or the principle, to which we give the name of
phlogiston.27
The smell emanating from the metal undergoing calcination cannot and should not be
ignored. It signals ‘something’ – ‘to which we give the name of phlogiston’ – before and
independently of what this thing is. The undeniable sensual experience implied for
Priestley an indubitable material existence. It was as important, if not more so, than the
acknowledged fact that weight was gained. Priestley’s reasoning was not an isolated
instance. Johan Christian Wiegleb, for instance, German pharmacist and chemical
educator, advanced a similar point in asking, rhetorically, ‘would it be reasonable to
24 Trevor H. Levere and Gerard L’E. Turner, Discussing Chemistry and Steam, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002, 196; Robert Siegfried, ‘The Chemical Revolution in the history of chemistry’, Osiris (1988) 4,
pp. 34–50, 35. For a study of Priestley’s scientiﬁc methodology see Victor D. Boantza, ‘Collecting airs and
ideas: Joseph Priestley’s style of experimental reasoning’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (2007)
38, pp. 506–522. According to Holmes, Priestley was not defending Stahl’s property-bearing phlogiston at all,
but advocating a novel pneumatic theory in its stead, only loosely committed to traditional phlogiston, and his
phlogistic perceptions were merely ‘scattered responses to particular observations . . . not connected into a
broader framework’. Frederic L. Holmes, ‘The “revolution in chemistry and physics”: overthrow of a reigning
paradigm or competition between contemporary research programs?’ Isis (2000) 91, pp. 735–753, 748. Again,
it is not Priestley’s phologiston theory that we examine here, but his defence of the existence of ‘something’. For
a discussion of the slight historiography, privileging the merits of Priestley’s phlogistic defense over Kirwan’s,
see Victor D. Boantza, ‘The phlogistic role of heat in the Chemical Revolution and the origins of Kirwan’s
“Ingenious modiﬁcations . . . into the theory of phlogiston”’, Annals of Science (2008) 65, pp. 309–338. See
also Georgette Taylor, ‘Uniﬁcation achieved: William Cullen’s theory of heat and phlogiston as an example of
his philosophical chemistry’, BJHS (2006) 39, pp. 477–501.
25 Joseph Priestley, Experiments and Observations Relating to the Analysis of Atmospherical Air, London:
J. Johnson, 1796, p. 58.
26 Priestley, op. cit. (25), p. 42; italics in original.
27 Priestley, op. cit. (25), p. 42; italics in original.
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question the existence of [an inﬂammable] principle, because one cannot pick it up
immediately?’28
I think not, since experience proves that during the calcination of metals, or while other bodies
burn with a ﬂame, a particular matter, sensitive to the sense of smell, spreads through the air,
and it must be the same one upon which the inﬂammability of these bodies depends; because
the latter, having been stripped of this principle, are either entirely consumed, or cease to be
ﬂammable.29
The surprising concurrence between the likes of St John, Wiegleb and Fourcroy
indicates that there was more to Priestley’s point than an old man’s desperate clinging
to a defunct, pre-theoretical perception of what the essence of inﬂammability or
combustibility might be.30 It suggests that Priestley’s insistence that sensual experience is
a deﬁnite sign of ‘something’ being released reﬂects a common underlying assumption
concerning the nature of the chemical substance and its place and function within the
chemical process. Kirwan, the most prominent spokesman of the late phlogistic camp,31
reasoned along similar lines, explaining in his Essay,
If a solution of mercury in the nitrous acid be dropped into common marine acid, it forms white
precipitate, which is phlogisticated, since it affords red vapours, when re-dissolved in the
28 For details on Wiegleb’s life and work see James Riddick Partington, A History of Chemistry, 4 vols.,
London, 1961–70, vol. 3, pp. 567–569. See also Hufbauer, op. cit. (17), pp. 88–92.
29 Johann Christian Wiegleb, ‘Doctrine de Stahl sur le Phlogistique, rectiﬁée et appuyée par des preuves, en
opposition au nouveau Systême chimique des François, dont on cherche en même tems à démontrer le peu de
solidité, Extrait des Annales de Chimie de Crell’,Observations sur la physique (1792) 41, pp. 84–85, 84, italics
added: ‘Serait-il raisonnable de mettre l’existence de ce principe en doute, parce qu’on ne peut le recueillir
immédiatement? Je réponds par la négative car l’expérience prouve que pendant la calcination des métaux, ou
pendant que d’autres corps brûlent avec une ﬂamme, il se répand dans l’air une matière particulière sensible à
l’odorat, et qui doit être la même dont dépend l’inﬂammabilité de ces corps; car ces derniers ayant été dépouillés
de ce principe, sont ou entièrement consumés, ou cessent d’être inﬂammables.’
30 For such portrayals of Priestley see, for example, Maurice Crosland, ‘“Slippery substances”: some
practical and conceptual problems in the understanding of gases in the pre-Lavoisier era’, in Frederic L. Holmes
and Trevor H. Levere (eds.), Instruments and Experimentation in the History of Chemistry, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 79–104, 88; Robert E. Schoﬁeld, The Enlightened Joseph Priestley:
A Study of His Life and Work from 1773 to 1804, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,
2004, p. 138, p. 193; Jenny Uglow, The Lunar Men: Five Friends Whose Curiosity Changed the World,
New York: Faber, 2002, p. 237.
31 In 1792 Kirwan abandoned phlogiston. For Priestley’s solemn reﬂection on Kirwan’s conversion see
Joseph Priestley, The Doctrine of Phlogiston Established and That of the Composition of Water Refuted,
Northumberland, PA, 1800, p. 2. See also Seymour Mauskopf, ‘Richard Kirwan’s phlogiston theory: its
success and fate’, Ambix (2002) 49, pp. 185–205. Thomas Beddoes, Bergman’s translator, remarked in an
appended note that ‘before the publication of Mr Cavendish’s paper on air . . .Mr Kirwan seems to have almost
succeeded in persuading chemists, that ﬁxed air is generated in phlogistic processes, by the union of vital air
with phlogiston’. Torbern Olof Bergman, A Dissertation on Elective Attractions, 2nd edn (tr. Thomas
Beddoes), London: John Murray, 1785, pp. 352–353. In a 1782 letter to Josiah Wedgwood, Priestley related,
‘Before my late experiments phlogiston was indeed almost given up by the Lunar Society, but now it seems to be
reestablished. Mr. Kirwan in a letter I have received from him this day, says that he has given in a paper to the
R. Society, to prove, frommy former experiments that phlogiston must be the same thing with inﬂammable air,
and also that dephlogisticated air and phlogiston make ﬁxed air.’ Robert E. Schoﬁeld (ed.), A Scientiﬁc
Biography of Joseph Priestley, 1733–1804; Selected Scientiﬁc Correspondence, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1966, pp. 206–207.
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nitrous acid. But if the nitrous solution of mercury be dropped into dephlogisticated marine
acid, it forms sublimate corrosive, which does not give red vapours when the nitrous acid is
poured on it.32
The ‘red vapours’ are a sign of phlogiston. Like the ‘strong smell’ noticed by Priestley
and Wiegleb, they cannot be ignored, for they signal the presence of a material entity.
This presence, so vivid and unquestionable to the traditional chemist, is absent in the
new chemistry. Responding to Kirwan’s analysis of the marine (muriatic) acid, Berthollet
ignored the ‘red vapours’ altogether, asserting that ‘if hydrogene [Kirwan’s phlogiston]
exists in the muriatic acid, there is no fact which shows its existence’. Once the vapours
and their particular colour had been rendered ‘no fact’, Berthollet was justiﬁed in asking,
‘is not the phlogiston therefore that [Kirwan] supposes, an useless being, which has no
inﬂuence in any of the phenomena we have endeavoured to explain, relating to the
properties of the oxygenated muriatic acid?’33
Phlogiston became ‘an useless being’ precisely because ‘red vapours’ became a ‘no
fact’. In the new chemistry facts were of a different order than vapours, colours and
smells. The ‘explanation of what happens in calcination’, Berthollet emphasized,
together with the other authors of the Method, ‘is not an hypothesis, but the result of
absolute facts’, which are established in a particular and distinct fashion:
It was then proved that in the calcination of metals, either under bell-glasses, or in closely
stopped vessels and with certain quantities of air, the air becomes decomposed, and the metal
becomes augmented in its weight by a quantity precisely equal to that of the air absorbed.34
In the new chemistry, ‘absolute facts’ were ‘certain quantities’, the results of precise
weighing of the outcomes of processes in carefully enclosed systems.35 The competing
analyses of aqua regia (a mixture of concentrated nitric and hydrochloric acids) exhibit a
similar disagreement. Advancing a causal explanation, Kirwan referred to qualities
picked up by the senses, suggesting that ‘part of the nitrous acid is converted into nitrous
air, which immediately unites to the undecomposed part of the nitrous acid, and forms
phlogisticated nitrous acid, and hence the red colour of the liquor’.36 Berthollet’s
response, in contrast, consisted of a strictly quantitative analysis. ‘The part of the
32 Kirwan, op. cit. (7), pp. 128–129; italics added.
33 Kirwan, op. cit. (7), p. 135.
34 Berthollet, Fourcroy and Morveau, op. cit. (1), p. 221; italics added.
35 In her thorough study of the concept of afﬁnity Kim stresses that the difference between Kirwan and
Lavoisier could not be ascribed to Kirwan’s disinterest or incompetence in quantitative analysis – quite the
contrary. Concentrating on Lavoisier’s perspective on the controversial issues, she comments only on Kirwan’s
empirical arguments and not on their intellectual motivations: ‘Kirwan’s entire critique of the antiphlogistic
camp rested on precise measurements of speciﬁc weights. He was in fact one step ahead of his French opponents
in advocating the importance of these measurements for chemical theory . . . Lavoisier differed from Kirwan not
in his deeper commitment to the rule of the balance but in his algebraic vision of chemistry and in his
grammatical understanding of nature. That is, the superior explanatory power of his system lay in the
interlocking algebra of all the components, rather than in its application to particular cases at hand.’ Kim,
op. cit. (13), p. 380.
36 Kirwan, op. cit. (7), p. 138; italics added. Compare Lissa Roberts, ‘The death of the sensuous chemist: the
“New” Chemistry and the transformation of sensuous technology’, Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science (1995) 26, pp. 503–529.
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muriatic acid, which combines with the oxigene’, he reasoned, ‘does not remain in the
liquid, but is disengaged, and maybe received in proportion as it is formed, at the
expense of part of the oxigene’.37 Attention to vapours, colours and smell, Berthollet
stresses, with less respect to Kirwan than usual, is not only spurious; it is positively
misleading:
It is with great reason that Mr. Kirwan ﬁnds it surprising, that the muriatic acid of the aqua
regia can remain united in the oxygenated state with a small quantity of the nitrous acid . . . it is
enough to have taken notice of its extremely penetrating smell and its great disposition to ﬂy off
in vapours . . . the author therefore has a mere supposition, when he afﬁrmed that the volatile
alkali is destroyed in the preparation of aqua regia by the amoniacal muriate; which is so far
from being well founded.38
For Berthollet the cause of Kirwan’s mistake was obvious: the great Irish chemist was
confused by smell and vapours.
This is not to suggest that chemists before Lavoisier had any qualms about the
chemical practice of weighing or the implementation of precise techniques of measure-
ment. Nicholson emphasized that ‘the beginning and end of every exact chemical process
consists in weighing’.39 Cavendish, who in 1784 was still convinced that ‘the commonly
received principle of phlogiston explains all phenomena, at least as well as
Mr Lavoisier’s’,40 was particularly skilled in precise quantitative experimentation and
‘his measurements [were] made with “superhuman care”’.41 Furthermore, the defenders
of phlogiston acknowledged the great advance in weighing procedures introduced by the
antiphlogistians. Lavoisier, Kirwan commended, is ‘a philosopher of great eminence,
who was the ﬁrst that introduced an almost mathematical precision into experimental
philosophy’. Nicholson, however, in his introduction to Kirwan’s Essay, suggested
treating some of these claims to accuracy with caution:42
it happens, however, most commonly, in the determination of weights, which is half the
business of a chemist, that an account of the admission of elements of speciﬁc gravity, carried to
too many places of ﬁgures . . . or sometimes from actual noting of weights to a degree of
minuteness which experiment cannot justify, we ﬁnd the results to exhibit an unwarrantable
pretension to accuracy.43
Nicholson’s ironic attitude towards the rhetoric of precision does not reﬂect a
rejection of ‘exact chemical . . . weighing’ as a crucial empirical practice. Rather, it
37 Kirwan, op. cit. (7), p. 142.
38 Kirwan, op. cit. (7), pp. 142–143; italics added.
39 Nicholson, op. cit. (11), p. 59. Although Nicholson admitted by this point that phlogiston was not
without its problems, he still thought that the antiphlogistic system was equally problematic and in his First
Principles of Chemistry he presented both systems. See Partington, op. cit. (28), vol. 3, p. 490.
40 Henry Cavendish, ‘Experiments on air’, Philosophical Transactions (1784) 74, pp. 119–153, 152.
41 Christa Jungnickel and Russell McCormmach, Cavendish: The Experimental Life, Lewisburg: Bucknell
University Press, 1999, esp. pp. 355–392, p. 359. This refers speciﬁcally to his pneumatic practice.
42 Kirwan, op. cit. (7), 7. On the Lavoisians’ ‘rhetoric of precision’ see Jan Golinski, ‘Precision instruments
and the demonstrative order of proof in Lavoisier’s chemistry’,Osiris (1994) 9, pp. 30–47; idem, ‘“The nicety
of experiment”: precision of measurement and precision of reasoning in late eighteenth-century chemistry’, in
M. Norton Wise (ed.), The Values of Precision, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, pp. 72–91.
43 Kirwan, op. cit. (7), p. vii.
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conveys the phlogistians’ discomfort with the subjection of all chemical experimentation
to weighing and with the conceptions of matter and of chemical knowledge implied by
this reduction (see Figure 1).
‘The determination of weights’ was always crucial for the chemist, but it became
the ultimate empirical tool only with the assumption of a homogeneous material
infrastructure to all chemical phenomena. The observation that bodies gain weight in
combustion was never contested. Yet this observation was a decisive argument against
the existence of phlogiston – and against its theoretical and practical framework – only
for those who accepted that matter is homogeneously heavy. Only with the assumption
of such homogeneity does every increase in weight indicate the addition of matter and
any loss of matter correspond directly to loss of weight. The assumption of homogeneity,
however, was in contrast with the chemistry of someone like Priestley, whose
professional pride as a chemist rested on an intimate familiarity with differences
and particularities, which for him comprised the chemical realm. Substances, in the
chemistry defended under the phlogistic banner, were ﬁrst and foremost particular
entities, and since their chemical functions were irreducible to the manifestations of a
homogeneous material substratum, neither their presence nor their absence could be
inferred solely from the detection of weight changes and exchanges.
For Priestley, weight computations could not comprise chemistry’s ultimate analytic
tool. Weight change was an important indicator, of course, but its causes were rarely
Figure 1. Weighing before Lavoisier. Note the prominence of accurate balances (on the right,
against the window) alongside traditional chemical alembics, cucurbits, furnaces, distillation
retorts and so on in this ﬁgure from William Lewis’s Commercium Philosophico-Technicum of
1765.
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transparent and it required as much skilled interpretation as any other chemical effect.
Overemphasizing weight calculations, Priestley complained, the antiphlogistians forgot
the basic chemical lore. ‘Because the calx of mercury derives its additional weight from
dephlogisticated air’, he explained,
the antiphlogistians have too hastily concluded that all metallic calces derive their additional
weight from the same cause. But this is not by any means a just inference. For the calces of some
metals are, in this and other respects, very different from one another, and even the different
calces of the same metal.44
The continuous avowal of the existence of phlogiston, even by chemists less committed
to it and more impressed than Priestley by Lavoisier’s arguments, expresses the refusal
to ignore smells and colours and the insistence on interpreting those as a sign of
‘something’, a chemical entity. For the chemistry they practised, every substance
comprised unique properties and every chemical phenomenon was an effect of causal
processes involving particular substances endowed with such unique properties.
Chemical knowledge was predicated upon the study of these properties through
an array of empirical procedures, consisting of various phenomenological expressions,
as Bergman explained in words Priestley and Scheele would have readily accepted:
‘the knowledge of the form, taste, solubility, tendency to efﬂoresce, and other
properties . . . of the substances, is of great use in enabling us to judge . . .whether any,
and what decomposition has taken place’.45
Like other phlogistians, Bergman was not opposed to chemical accuracy or careful
mathematical representation, and he noted that ‘a more accurate measure of [attraction],
which might be expressed in numbers, is as yet a desideratum’.46 Yet aspiring to greater
accuracy in chemical practice and theory could not justify the reduction of matter to
sheer bulk, of chemical phenomena to the aggregation of mass, or of the wide variety of
chemical experimental practices to weighing. Echoing Priestley’s lamentations, Bergman
observed how ‘smell also often indicates what is taking place’, and how ‘the taste
likewise often informs an experienced tongue’.47
Priestley’s arguments concerning the interpretation of the famous experimentum
crucis with the calx of mercury demonstrate how fundamental this reasoning was for the
defence of phlogiston and, through it, of traditional chemistry. ‘That mercury revived
either by inﬂammable air or in close vessels has the same properties will not be denied’,
Priestley conceded, ‘and if so, it must consist of the same principles, and in the same
proportion, or nearly so’. According to the traditional chemistry, as Nicholson
summarized, ‘metals, like all other inﬂammable bodies, contain phlogiston united to a
base’,48 so Priestley (like Scheele two decades earlier) assumed that ‘phlogiston
passes . . . thro’ the glass when the calx is revived’.49 Yet Priestley was willing to assume,
44 Priestley, op. cit. (31), p. 15; italics added.
45 Bergman, op. cit. (31), p. 65.
46 Bergman, op. cit. (31), p. 4.
47 Bergman, op. cit. (31), p. 67.
48 Nicholson, op. cit. (11), p. 131.
49 Priestley, op. cit. (31), p. 35.
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for the sake of argument, that the antiphlogistians were correct and that the ‘difference
between the calx [of mercury] and the metal [mercury], is that the latter has parted
with the air which it had imbibed’. Yet for this to be a ‘proof that metals are simple
substances’, and that calcination does not involve the release of phlogiston, one had to
conclude that this is true ‘in all other cases of calcination, as well as this’. But this was
patently false, for ‘this is the case of only this particular calx of this metal’. Homogeneity
of substances cannot be inferred from similarity in appearances, Priestley stressed, for
‘though with the same external appearance’,
the same metal may contain different proportions of any particular principle, as phlogiston,
they must be denominated different substances, if some specimens contain this element, and
others be wholly destitute of it. All, therefore, that can be inferred from the experiment with the
precipitate per se is, that in this particular case, the mercury in becoming that calx imbibed air,
without parting with any, or very little of its phlogiston . . .mercury may have the same external
appearance, and all its essential properties, and yet contain different proportions of something
that enters into it.50
What the antiphlogistians considered a cornerstone of their reinterpretation of
pneumatic processes – inferred directly from rigorous computations in close accord with
the principle of weight conservation –was for Priestley a mere instance of a ‘particular
case’. Mercury’s speciﬁc constitution, in this particular chemical reaction, allowed it to
absorb air while parting with almost no phlogiston; such were the ‘proportions’ of its
‘particular principle[s]’. Even ‘different proportions’ of constituents did not necessarily
entail a change in a substance’s essence. After all, Priestley concluded by way of question,
‘what is the evidence of a change in the nature of any thing, but a change in its
properties?’51
The insistence on particularities as the foundation for chemical knowledge was what
led Priestley to reject the Lavoisians’ interpretation of another crucial experiment: the
synthesis and decomposition of water. This, the phlogistians had to admit, was a strong
argument against their stance, as Kirwan remarked, concerning the synthesis of water:
[phlogiston is] no longer to be regarded as a mere hypothetical substance, since it could be
exhibited in an aerial form in as great a degree of purity as any other air. This opinion seems
to have met the approbation of the most distinguished philosophers . . . nor can I see what
Mr. Lavoisier could reply, before the important discovery of water made by Mr. Cavendish.
This furnished him with a new and unexpected source from which he could derive the
inﬂammable air.52
Like Kirwan, Priestley did not deny that water was a compound that could be
decomposed and recomposed, analysed and synthesized. He even seems to have accepted
the Lavoisians’ account of what takes place in the experiment itself:
The proof that water is decomposed, and resolved into two kinds of air, is that when steam is
made to pass over red-hot iron inﬂammable air is produced, and the iron acquires an addition
50 Priestley, op. cit. (25), pp. 39–41; italics added.
51 Priestley, op. cit. (25), p. 49; italics in original.
52 Kirwan, op. cit. (7), p. 5; italics added.
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of weight, becoming what is called ﬁnery cinder; but what they [the Lavoisians] call oxide
of iron.53
Priestley, however, could not consider this experiment as an instance of oxidation; that
would equate it with other processes that according to the antiphlogistians were similar
chemical instances – of the same oxidation – such as rusting. Such identiﬁcation ﬂew in
the face of fundamental chemical knowledge, as Priestley understood it: ‘common rust of
iron, has a very different appearance from this ﬁnery cinder, being red, and not black’.
For Priestley, appearances stood for properties and properties were carried by substances
(we explain below how his concept of ‘degrees of phlogistication’ ﬁts into this close
relation between substances and properties). Consequently, even Fourcroy’s explanation
that ‘iron is partially oxygenated’was unacceptable to Priestley: it implied that ‘common
rust’ and ‘ﬁnery cinder’54 were essentially the same substance, differing only in that they
exhibited varying degrees of oxidation. But the different properties of rust and cinder,
according to Priestley, demonstrated their essentially different ‘nature’: ‘iron in this state
is saturated with some very different principle, which even excludes that which would
have converted it into rust’.55 As late as 1800 Priestley was still complaining of ‘the
experiments adduced in support of [oxidation] being not only ambiguous, or explicable
on either hypothesis, but exceedingly few’.56 But just as his defence of phlogiston was
aimed at rescuing the irreducible particularity and speciﬁcity of the chemical account of
phenomena, his arguments against the explanatory power of oxidation and its empirical
support were aimed at fending off the threat of reduction that the overarching concept of
oxidation presented.
‘Certain quantities’ versus ‘proportions’
Lavoisier famously succeeded in portraying ‘Dr. Priestley’s work’ as but ‘a train of
experiments, not much interrupted by any reasoning, an assemblage of facts’.57 It is
therefore important to stress that Priestley’s underscoring of differences and particula-
rities was not just a stubborn anti-theoretical or naive empiricist stance. His rejection of
Fourcroy’s analysis was based on a distinctly theoretical consideration. For Priestley, as
well as for other pneumatic chemists, phlogistication and dephlogistication of pneumatic
entities such as airs (for Scheele also heat and light) were processes of transmutation.
Aerial entities transmuted one into another upon the loss and gain of phlogiston (as we
shall explain below); they changed some of their properties but retained their common
pneumatic essence. Reacting to phlogiston they changed their ‘nature’ – they became
different substances. From the phlogistians’ perspective therefore, although gradual
53 Priestley, op. cit. (31), p. 42; italics in original.
54 Finery: a hearth where cast iron is made malleable, or in which steel is made from pig-iron (Oxford
English Dictionary).
55 Priestley, op. cit. (31), pp. 46–47.
56 Priestley, op. cit. (31), pp. 76–77; italics added.
57 Antoine Laurent Lavoisier, Essays Physical and Chemical, 2nd edn (tr. Thomas Henry), London: Frank
Cass, 1970 (ﬁrst published 1776), 121. See note 30 above for historians adopting this portrayal.
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addition (or subtraction) of phlogiston to airs made sense, Fourcroy’s ‘partially
oxygenated’ metals did not: ‘nature’ could not be changed ‘partially’.
In the new French chemistry air and different vapours represented particular
substances as much as they expressed states of matter (solid, liquid, gaseous). For
Lavoisier each gas was a different chemical species whose involvement in chemical
processes was as different as that of various solids and liquids. Solids could combine
with solids, liquids, and airs in the same fashion as airs combined with airs. The state of
the body was irrelevant in this context. This implied an elimination of the distinction
between air(s) and metals that the phlogistians could not accept. Defending phlogiston
against Lavoisier’s assault meant, among other things, defending a concept of a chemical
substance as a particular species of matter, endowed with substantial qualities
irreducible to quantities of homogeneous bulk.58 This did not preclude thinking about
chemical substances in terms of relative proportions and combinations, for ‘the same
substances in different combinations, and in different states, have different properties’
and ‘substances possessed of very different properties may be composed of the same
elements, in different proportions, and different modes of combination’.59 Indeed, the
basic pneumatic phlogistic hypothesis, going all the way back to ‘the phlogiston of
Stahl’, was that combustibility and inﬂammability of bodies are functions of the degree
of phlogiston they contain:
the purest air is that which contains the least phlogiston: that air is impure (by which I mean
that it is unﬁt for respiration, and for the purpose of supporting ﬂame) in proportion that it
contains more of that principle; and that there is a regular gradation from dephlogisticated air,
through common air, and phlogisticated air, down to nitrous air; the last species of air
containing the most, and the ﬁrst-mentioned the least phlogiston possible . . . so that all these
kinds of air differ chieﬂy in the quantity of phlogiston they contain.60
The ‘kinds of air’, Priestley summarizes, ‘differ chieﬂy in the quantity of phlogiston’, but
it will be a mistake to read him as suggesting a truly quantitative analysis of
phlogistication. The ‘gradation’ of phlogiston did not stand for its different relative
amounts but implied the level of an air’s purity or impurity, namely its ability to support
respiration and combustion; there was no real sense in which the ‘quantity of phlogiston’
could be isolated, measured or perceived independently of the different level of impurity
it was linked with. Phlogistication or dephlogistication did not consist of an arithmetic
addition or subtraction of quantities of phlogiston but entailed a transmutation, by
which one kind of air turned into another, following regular and constant sequences
such as dephlogisticated, common, phlogisticated and nitrous airs, according to
Priestley’s basic sequence. The different ‘proportion[s] . . . of that principle’ produced
differences in pneumatic ‘kinds’. The various steps of this sequence implied various
‘proportions’ of phlogiston, yet these proportions represented the distinct properties of
58 For an insightful study of ‘substances’ in eighteenth-chemistry, focusing on various technologies of their
preparation, manipulation and especially classiﬁcation, see Ursula Klein and Wolfgang Lefèvre, Materials in
Eighteenth-Century Science: A Historical Ontology, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007.
59 Priestley, op. cit. (31), pp. 35–36.
60 Joseph Priestley, ‘An account of further discoveries in air’, Philosophical Transactions (1775) 65,
pp. 384–394, 392; italics in original.
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each of the distinct airs. As such, they were expressions of these steps as much as they
were their causes.61
To wit, although expressed in terms of quantities of phlogiston, it was a process –
phlogistication – that Priestley described and analysed, a process he had interpreted as a
transformation of aerial qualities. Priestley expressed this understanding in his account
of the nitrous air test, designed to evaluate what he referred to as the ‘goodness’ of a
given air.62 After explaining how to perform the test by mixing different airs with nitrous
air, then measuring the diminution in aerial bulk, Priestley added that ‘any other process
by which air is diminished and made noxious answers the same purpose . . . In fact, it is
phlogiston that is the test’.63 This status accorded to phlogiston shows why the demand
to isolate it, which became a major crux philosophiae,64 could be rendered at times as a
categorical misinterpretation of chemical knowledge, as Richard Watson claimed in
1787. Answering his own question, ‘what is phlogiston?’, Watson presented the demand
to isolate it as a complete fallacy:
you do not surely expect that chemistry should be able to present you with a handful of
phlogiston, separated from an inﬂammable body; you may just as reasonably demand a
handful of magnetism, gravity, or electricity to be extracted from a magnetic, weighty, or
electric body; there are powers in nature, which cannot otherwise become the objects of the
sense, than by the effects they produce, and of this kind is phlogiston.65
The difference between phlogiston and other imponderable entities, such as light and
caloric, expounded by the new chemistry, was not that the latter were less hypothetical
or more immediately quantiﬁable. In this context, Lavoisier’s use of caloric may seem
symmetrical to Priestley’s use of phlogiston:
the same body becomes solid, or ﬂuid, or aëriform, according to the quantity of caloric by
which it is penetrated; or . . . according as the repulsive force exerted by the caloric is equal to,
stronger or weaker than the attraction of the particles of the body it acts upon.66
But whereas Lavoisier’s quantities of caloric put ‘the same body’ into different states,
Priestley’s ‘gradations’ of phlogiston produced different aerial substances, which
transmuted into one another. It is the transmutational sequence that other phlogistians
like Scheele shared with Priestley, even though, as Fourcroy complained, they could not
agree on the speciﬁc products:
if empyreal Air is composed with more phlogiston than is necessary for producing heat, radiant
heat is produced; if some very little phlogiston be added, the property discovered in radiant heat
is then increased and light is produced . . . each particle of Light is nothing more than a subtle
61 Priestley, op. cit. (60), p. 392.
62 See Trevor H. Levere, ‘Measuring gases and measuring goodness’, in Holmes and Levere, op. cit. (30),
pp. 105–135.
63 Priestley, op. cit. (8), p. 208; italics in original.
64 As exempliﬁed by Kirwan’s approach, which mostly revolved around endowing phlogiston with a
material existence in its presentation as inﬂammable air.
65 Richard Watson, Chemical Essays, 4th edn, London, 1787, p. 167.
66 Lavoisier, op. cit. (10), p. 7.
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particle of empyreal Air, which is more charged with phlogiston than an equally subtle particle
of heat.67
Whereas Priestley’s sequence consisted of four kinds of air (dephlogisticated, common,
phlogisticated and nitrous), Scheele’s sequence included empyreal air (analogous to
dephlogisticated air), light, heat and inﬂammable air. Later on Scheele adds that ‘with a
small addition of phlogiston it produces light; and with still more, the well known
inﬂammable air’.68 Inﬂammable air, Scheele’s most phlogisticated entity, was later
advanced by Kirwan as phlogiston in an aerial state (or phlogiston gas).69 However
different the sequences they stipulated, pneumatic chemists like Priestley, Scheele and
Kirwan all subscribed to the notion of transmutational sequences.
Bergman, Nicholson, Priestley and their phlogistian colleagues shared Lavoisier’s
aspiration to quantitative accuracy. But the explanatory role Lavoisier had assigned to
quantiﬁcation militated against their basic concept of matter. For them, the various
‘kinds of airs’, endowed with different properties, were ipso facto different substances.
They could not be merely different states, distinguished only quantitatively. Put
differently, from the ontological perspective of the traditional chemistry that they were
struggling to preserve, substance was a chemical entity whereas a material state was
merely physical. ‘Dr. Priestley’, Nicholson observed, discovered ‘a considerable number
of aerial ﬂuids.’ These airs, he explained, reﬂecting on Priestley’s sequence, were
distinguished by degree of phlogistication: ‘common or atmospheric air’, ‘ﬁxed air’,
‘nitrous air’. They were, nevertheless, distinct substances; particulars endowed with
essential properties and not states of the same substance. According to Lavoisier, ‘air
is a ﬂuid naturally existing in a state of vapour’, but Nicholson viewed ‘vapours’ as
mere ‘elastic ﬂuids or subtle invisible matters which ﬂy from bodies subjected to
chemical operation or otherwise’. ‘Accurate chemical writers’, Nicholson stressed,
‘conﬁne this appellation [of vapour] to such exhalations only as may be condensed
into the ﬂuid state by cold’.70 A substance’s ephemeral existence in a particular state
was evidently ‘in contradistinction to the aerial ﬂuids, of which scarcely any are so
convertible by any means in our power’.71 Airs of varying degrees of phlogistication
were no vapours:
Air is a generic name of such invisible and exceedingly rare ﬂuids as posses a very high degree of
elasticity, and are not condensable into the liquid state by any degree of cold hitherto produced.
This last circumstance is the only distinctive criterion between air and vapour; for vapour is
condensable by cold.72
67 Carl Wilhelm Scheele, Chemical Observations and Experiments on Air and Fire (tr. Johann Reinhold
Forster; intr. Torbern Bergman; added notes Richard Kirwan, Joseph Priestley), London, 1780, pp. 97–99;
italics in original.
68 Scheele, op. cit. (67), p. 178.
69 Boantza, op. cit. (24).
70 Lavoisier, op. cit. (10), p. 29; Nicholson, op. cit. (14), vol. 2, p. 959.
71 Nicholson, op. cit. (14), vol. 2, p. 959.
72 Nicholson, op. cit. (14), vol. 1, p. 72.
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The force of afﬁnity and afﬁnity as a force
This distinction between airs and vapours reveals the fundamental ontological units that
people like Nicholson and Bergman were defending when they were clinging to the
concept of phlogiston. ‘Condensable’ vapours were mere physical states of matter; airs,
pneumatic entities charged with various ‘gradations’ of phlogiston, were chemical
substances. To eschew phlogiston was not merely to accept the superiority of a new
hypothesis over an old one, which most of these chemists were (grudgingly) willing to
admit, but to depart from a peculiar and distinct understanding of what chemical
substances were and of what constituted the relations between them.
If the fundamental chemical units of the phlogistians were substances with their
irreducible properties, the fundamental relations between these substances were
afﬁnities. Eighteenth-century chemists developed a growing mastery of the intricate
web of these relations and their roles in various chemical processes, which they
represented in the afﬁnity table, their emblematic ‘paper tool’.73 Phlogiston was an
essential component of the afﬁnity table from its ﬁrst introduction by Geoffroy in 1718,
and was still a crucial element in Bergman’s 1785 version, the most extensive afﬁnity
table of his time (see Figure 2).74 The defence of phlogiston was thus also a defence of a
particular understanding of what afﬁnities were – again, over and above phlogiston’s
own declining theoretical merit. As Bergman’s example demonstrates, his table reﬂected
and resulted from a particular type of chemical order, which entailed particular types of
chemical transformation:
Volatile alkali is dislodged by ﬁxed alkali and pure calcareous earth . . . quicksilver and silver
are precipitated from nitrous and vitriolic acids on the addition of copper, which is again
separated by iron. Silver, quicksilver and lead . . . are separated from nitrous acid both by the
vitriolic and marine. Do not these . . . shew, that there prevails a constant order among the
several substances?75
73 See Taylor, op. cit. (24); and Ursula Klein, Verbindung und Afﬁnität: die Grundlegung der neuzeitlichen
Chemie an der Wende vom 17. zum 18. Jahrhundert, Basel: Birkhaüser, 1994; idem, Tools and Modes of
Representation in the Laboratory Sciences, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001. For two outstanding histories of
chemical afﬁnity see Kim, op. cit. (13); Michelle Sadoun-Goupil, Du ﬂou au clair? Histoire de l’afﬁnité
chimique de Cardan à Prigogine, Paris: CTHS, 1991, esp. pp. 89–190 (for the post-Newtonian era until the end
of the eighteenth century).
74 Etienne-François Geoffroy, ‘Des different Rapports observes en Chymie entre differentes substances’,
Histoire de l’Academie royale des sciences, avec memoires (1718), pp. 256–269. Also translated as ‘Table of
the different relations observed in chemistry between different substances’, Science in Context (1996) 9,
pp. 313–319. Kim, op. cit. (13), p. 103, argues that ‘Geoffroy’s “sulphur principle” invariably referred to the
concrete oily substance contained in bodies. He later identiﬁed it with Stahl’s phlogiston . . . the oily substance
that restored metallicity to metals, formed the empirical core of the phlogiston theory in the course of the
eighteenth century’; in the early 1770s Lavoisier traced ‘the phlogiston theory in France back to Geoffroy’s
experiments with the burning glass. He had to work hard to dissociate phlogiston and the matter of ﬁre’. See
also Frederic L. Holmes, ‘The communal context for Etienne-François Geoffroy’s “Table des rapports”’,
Science in Context (1996) 9, pp. 289–311.
75 Bergman, op. cit. (31), p. 11. See also Kim, op. cit. (13); Goupil, op. cit. (73).
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The afﬁnity table was perhaps the most conspicuous tool of traditional chemistry to be
retained by the Lavoisians. Their conception of chemical afﬁnities and the respective
manner of their application, however, failed to impress Kirwan:
To explain the precipitation of metals dissolved in acids by other metals, Mr. Lavoisier thinks
it sufﬁcient that the oxigenous principle should have a greater afﬁnity to the precipitant
than to the precipitated metal . . . But the phenomena of precipitation are much more
complicated.76
This may seem a harsh assessment of Lavoisier’s work on afﬁnities. Lavoisier was aware
that ‘the table of afﬁnities of the oxigenous principle with the different substance’ is
far from perfect; ‘Mr. Kirwan’ he averred, ‘does not judge me with more severity than
I do myself.’77 Yet Kirwan’s complaint, as always, did not concern the antiphlogistians’
competence but the chemical principles – ontological and epistemological – underlying
their reasoning and practice. Even more so, Kirwan was defending the principles the
antiphlogistians rejected.
Figure 2. Afﬁnities in the traditional and the new chemistry. On the left: ‘Single Elective
Attractions’ from Bergman’s 1785Dissertation (phlogiston in column 36); on the right: Lavoisier’s
‘table of oxygenous principle’ from Kirwan’s 1789 Essay. Comparing the two tables demonstrates
the visual dimension of the reduction from the ‘richness’ of phlogistic traditional chemistry to the
‘bareness’ of the French system.
76 Kirwan, op. cit. (7), pp. 244–246; italics in original.
77 Kirwan, op. cit. (7), p. 46.
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Lavoisier conceded that afﬁnities were complex and difﬁcult to pin down, admitting
that ‘the force of afﬁnity, which unites two principles’, for example, ‘is not the same
in . . . two degrees of saturation’.78 Yet it is a ‘force’ that he is searching for; it is not
a quality of any particular substance, but a unifying principle of nature, subject to
mathematical laws which are simple and precise even if hard to discover: ‘afﬁnity is a
variable force, which decreases according to certain laws, not yet determined’.79
This idea of homogeneous force captures exactly what Kirwan and the late defenders
of phlogiston could not accept in the new chemistry’s perception and use of afﬁnities.
The term ‘force’ did have a natural place in the old system of afﬁnities as well. ‘In this
dissertation’, Bergman announced at the beginning of his work on afﬁnities, ‘I shall
endeavour to determine the order of attractions according to their respective force’.80
Moreover, in the homage to Newton with which he commenced his work, Bergman
made it clear that he understood well the concept of force as a universal presence
governed by simple mathematical laws.81 For Lavoisier, the two uses of ‘force’ – the
chemical and the physical – had to coincide, at least in principle; attractions and elective
afﬁnities were to be understood along the lines of Newtonian gravity: ‘two forces, both
of which are variable; the ﬁrst, according to a certain law dependant of temperature; and
the second, according to the distance’.82 Bergman, however, would never confuse this
universal simplicity of gravity governed by mathematical law with the complexity of the
attraction of afﬁnity. For Lavoisier, ‘force’was a physical, unifying principle, common to
all matter. For Bergman, attractions were particular properties of substances; force was
but a second-order property, the measure of their difference.
What the insistence on phlogiston represented, then, was resistance neither to the
replacement of one hypothesis with another, nor to the introduction of ‘mathematical
precision into experimental philosophy’, as Kirwan framed Lavoisier’s contributions.
Kirwan and Bergman were defending the autonomy of chemistry from physics.83 What
they refused to accept was the idea that the unifying principle of nature consisted, in
essence, of a simple material infrastructure governed by simple mathematical laws. What
they tried to maintain in their concept of afﬁnity was regularity of cause and effect,
rooted in the qualities of individual substances, which were, at the same time, wholly
embedded in continuous chemical processes: ‘By chemical operations or processes, we
mean the application of the proper means to affect the decomposition or composition.
78 Kirwan, op. cit. (7), p. 51.
79 Kirwan, op. cit. (7), p. 252.
80 Bergman, op. cit. (31), p. 4.
81 Bergman, op. cit. (31), pp. 2–3.
82 Kirwan, op. cit. (7), p. 46.
83 This is a complex subject and a leading theme in the historiography of chemistry. For an informative
discussion in relation to the Chemical Revolution and Lavoisier’s work in particular see Henry Guerlac,
‘Chemistry as a branch of physics: Laplace’s collaboration with Lavoisier’, Historical Studies in the Physical
Sciences (1976) 7, pp. 193–276; Evan M. Melhado, ‘Chemistry, physics, and the Chemical Revolution’, Isis
(1985) 76, pp. 195–211; see also the related responses and critiques by Arthur Donovan and C.E. Perrin in the
same journal.
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Every one of them is grounded on the various degrees of afﬁnities of heterogeneous
substances amongst each other.’84 Afﬁnities, a chemist like Friedrich Gren would still
assert in 1800,85 could not be perceived outside ‘chemical operations or processes’. Their
‘various degrees’, moreover, did not follow independent mathematical laws but the
relations ‘amongst heterogeneous substances’. Such substances, Bergman explained,
were ‘heterogeneous’ by virtue of possessing different qualities:
When homogeneous bodies tend to union, an increase of mass only takes place, the nature of
the body remaining still the same; and this effect is denominated the attraction of aggregation.
But heterogeneous substances, when mixed together, and left to themselves to form
combinations, are inﬂuenced by difference of quality rather than quantity. This we call
attraction of composition.86
Lavoisier’s interpretation of the reasons for the complexity of afﬁnities is revealing.
Justifying his own ‘table of afﬁnities’, in reaction to Kirwan’s critique, he argued,
A principal defect, common to all the tables of afﬁnities which have hitherto been made consists
in their presenting only the results of simple afﬁnities, whereas there exists only in
nature . . . cases of double afﬁnity, often triple, and others perhaps still more complicated.87
And in order ‘to form accurate ideas respecting these phenomena’, Lavoisier added,
it is necessary to consider all the bodies in nature as plunged in an elastic ﬂuid of great rarity
and lightness . . . [known as] the principle of heat . . . [which] would separate them [their parts] if
they were not retained by their mutual attraction, that is to say, the attraction which is
commonly called the afﬁnity of aggregation.88
There was no place for the sharp distinction between ‘heterogeneous’ and ‘homo-
geneous’ substances in Lavoisier’s system. Since all matter was homogeneous and
consequently homogeneously heavy, all unions had ultimately to abide by the rules of
‘aggregation’. Both Bergman and Lavoisier, then, had recourse to the concept of
aggregated matter. Yet even the difference in their particular phrasings is instructive.
Bergman paired ‘aggregation’ with ‘attraction’, distinguishing it from ‘attraction of
composition’, as the other type of possible combination: the chemical. This distinction
was altogether ignored by Lavoisier, who intentionally blurred the division between the
chemical and the physical, referring to the ‘afﬁnity of aggregation’ as the only existing
type of combination. For him, only one kind of chemical ‘afﬁnity’ existed – that of
‘aggregation’ –which was physical in the sense that it was universal to ‘all the bodies in
nature’ and abided by the (Newtonian) laws of ‘mutual attraction’. This was how the
chemical complexity of afﬁnities and their particularities, as entailed by their relational
84 Friedrich Albrecht Carl Gren, Principles of Modern Chemistry, Systematically Arranged, 2 vols.,
London, 1800, vol. 1, p. 50; italics in original.
85 For details on Gren’s life and work see Partington, op. cit. (28), vol. 3, pp. 575–577. For an extensive and
informative discussion of Gren’s phlogistic work and the various criticisms adduced against it during the last
two decades of the eighteenth century see Partington and McKie, op. cit. (17), third article. See also Hufbauer,
op. cit. (17).
86 Bergman, op. cit. (31), p. 5; italics in original.
87 Kirwan, op. cit. (7), pp. 45–46.
88 Kirwan, op. cit. (7), p. 45.
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character, were replaced by ‘accurate ideas’. This accuracy hardly served to settle
Kirwan’s worries. He complained that the ‘simplicity’ of the ‘antiphlogistic hypothesis
. . . though seducing in some cases, becomes insufﬁciency in many others. I pass over
many other embarrassing objections’ (see below).89
Bergman’s table is at once a tour de force of chemical knowledge and an admission of
its limits. It is an attempt at the highest level of formalization attainable, given the limited
regularity of chemical processes and their irreducible complexity. In fact, this complexity
is the single most distinctive characteristic of afﬁnities. Justifying ‘the necessity for a new
Table of Attractions’, Bergman wryly admitted,
I am very far from venturing to assert, that that which I offer is perfect, since I know with
certainty, that the slight sketch now proposed will require above 30,000 exact experiments
before it can be brought to any degree of perfection. But when I reﬂected on the shortness of
life, and the instability of health, I resolved to publish my observations, however defective, lest
they should perish with my papers.90
Uniformity versus simplicity
From the point of view of the late defenders of phlogiston, therefore, phlogiston and
oxygen were not symmetrical. To say that all inﬂammables contain phlogiston was to
suggest a unifying hypothesis. To say that they all have afﬁnity to oxygen was only to
repeat that they are inﬂammable. Moreover, the Lavoisians used the term ‘afﬁnity’ in
a way traditional chemists could not accept. Afﬁnity as understood by the latter was
not a universal, physical force but an expression of the interrelation between various
substances. Afﬁnity tables described patterns of such relations as displayed by the
elective chemical behaviours of recognizable substances.
Yet it is not because afﬁnities were lost on the new chemistry that the adherents of ‘the
old system’ complained.91 Quite the contrary: Kirwan, still in his phlogistic mode,92 had
to admit that some accounts by chemical afﬁnities are much more suited to ‘the
antiphlogistic hypothesis’. For example, ‘why iron precipitates copper from the vitriolic
acid, may be explained in the antiphlogistic hypothesis, since iron is said to have a
greater afﬁnity to the oxigenous principle than copper has, and also to take up more of
it’.93 Yet there is a fundamental tenet to Lavoisier’s analysis by afﬁnities that Kirwan
could not permit. In one of his responses to Kirwan’s Essay, Lavoisier claimed to have
proved that whenever one metal was precipitated by another, and re-appeared under the
metallic form . . . the precipitating metal had taken the oxigene from the precipitated metal, and
that by comparing the respective quantities of the two metals employed, a conclusion must be
made of the quantities of oxigene necessary for the dissolution of each metal in the acids.94
89 Kirwan, op. cit. (7), p. 249.
90 Bergman op. cit. (31), pp. 69–70.
91 Kirwan, op. cit. (7), p. 167.
92 On Kirwan’s capitulation see Mauskopf, op. cit. (31).
93 Kirwan, op. cit. (7), p. 248.
94 Kirwan, op. cit. (7), p. 250; italics added.
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Unlike Priestley’s ‘quantities of phlogiston’, Lavoisier’s ‘quantities of oxigene’ are
gauged strictly by weighing; characteristically, Lavoisier applies here a quantitative
analysis to a distinctly chemical pattern: the recovery of substances by precipitation.
Kirwan found this type of analysis – the attempt to infer the chemical (substances, nature
of reactions, etc.) directly from the physical (ultimately represented by quantities) –
severely lacking, ignoring many of the crucial phenomena to be accounted for:
But why copper, which is insoluble in the dilute vitriolic acid should become soluble in a dilute
solution of vitriol of iron exposed to the air, or in a boiling heat, seems to me difﬁcult
to conceive in the new hypothesis, for the iron should not only retain the oxigenous principle,
with which it is far from being saturated, but also take up that which comes from the
atmosphere . . . [this is one] of the many difﬁculties in which the antiphlogistic hypothesis is
involved. They are sufﬁcient to shew that its simplicity, though seducing in some cases, becomes
insufﬁciency in many others.95
The difference in the understanding of the explanatory role and ontological status of
afﬁnity highlights the dissatisfaction with the new chemistry’s account of combustion
and calcination processes which clinging to phlogiston expressed, a dissatisfaction
emerging from a fundamental conviction of what comprises a natural law and its use in
chemical explanations. This difference is best perceived by a closer look at the use of the
term ‘force’ in the context of afﬁnities.
Lavoisier’s Newtonian allusion in this context was not haphazard. Bergman was using
attractions to mean both chemical afﬁnities and physical forces, but was always careful
to distinguish between the chemical ‘attractions of composition’ and the physical
‘attractions of aggregation’ which were expressions of Newtonian universal gravitation.
Lavoisier, as we have seen above, used both notions interchangeably, blurring the
difference, crucial to traditional chemists, between distinctly chemical properties and the
universal physical force:
as the attraction of these particles for each other is diminished in the inverse ratio of their
distance, it is evident that there must be a certain point of distance of particles when the afﬁnity
they possess with each other becomes less than that they have for oxygen, and at which
oxygenation must necessarily take place if oxygen be present.96
Interpreting afﬁnity as an underlying force, identical in all the substances exhibiting it,
Lavoisier could utilize it to replace phlogiston as the general principle of inﬂammability:
where inﬂammable bodies were the ones containing phlogiston, they were now those
possessed of a high afﬁnity to oxygen. ‘Several conditions are requisite to enable a body
to become oxygenated’, Lavoisier explained, ‘and primarily, that the particles of the
body . . . shall have less reciprocal attraction with each other than they have for the
Oxygen’.97 This, from the perspective of traditional chemistry, was a hopelessly
simplistic and reductive account. Even one type of combustion, like calcination, was
95 Kirwan, op. cit. (7), p. 249; italics added.
96 Lavoisier, op. cit. (10), p. 186.
97 Lavoisier, op. cit. (10), p. 185.
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a complex process, differing from one substance to another, as Kirwan tirelessly
described:
to calcine a metal is to deprive it of its metallic splendour, or reduce it to a brittle, less coherent
and pulverent form: malleable metals thereby lose their malleability, and mercury its liquidity.
To reduce a metal is to restore to it the metallic lustre, and the degree of coherence and
malleability peculiar to it . . . The differences substances by whose means in different degrees of
heat, different metallic substances may be calcined, are respirable air, water, acids, alkalis,
mercury, with the assistance of respirable air, and various other metallic substances in different
circumstances.98
It is precisely this emphasis on ‘differences’, the emphasis on the intrinsic complexity
of nature, that the antiphlogistians challenged. ‘We may justly admire the simplicity of
the means employed by nature to multiply qualities and forms’, declared Lavoisier,
whether by combining three or four acidiﬁable bases in different proportions, or by altering the
dose of oxygen employed for oxydating or acidifying them. We shall ﬁnd the means no less
simple and diversiﬁed, and as abundantly productive of forms and qualities, in the order of
bodies we are now about to treat of.99
Nature, according to the new chemistry, was in essence simple, and its diversity was
hence produced by equally simple means; chemistry should follow suit. ‘The method we
have adopted’, declared Lavoisier, ‘following nature in the simplicity of her operations,
gives natural and easy nomenclature applicable to every possible neutral salt’.100
The traditional chemists never denied this feature of the new theory. Kirwan, for
instance, readily admitted that it was ‘recommendable by its simplicity’. Yet it was a
‘false shew of simplicity’.101 ‘The more we succeed in simplifying the principles of
bodies, the more difﬁcult it is to determine truly what passes in chemical operations’, was
the way Nicholson formulated a similar concern.102 The conclusion from the irreducible
complexity of chemical processes, however, was not a call for phenomenological
scepticism (or for self-imposed modesty of an art versus a science). Kirwan’s complaint
was not that the antiphlogistians tried to explain too much but that they explained too
little. The ‘simplicity’ of their ‘doctrine’ was ‘insufﬁciency’ not because it offered more
order than nature allowed, but because, as he pointed out in the preface to his Essay, ‘the
ancient doctrine [is] the more uniform of the two’.103 It is more uniform, Bergman
explained, because it pays full attention to the richness of causal relations that bring
about natural phenomena:
It is beyond doubt, that the most minute circumstances have their efﬁcient causes; and these
causes, for the most part, are so interwoven with the more powerful ones, and so moderate their
98 Kirwan, op. cit. (7), p. 166.
99 Lavoisier, op. cit. (10), p. 149.
100 Lavoisier, op. cit. (10), p. 168; italics added.
101 Kirwan, op. cit. (7), pp. 7–8.
102 Nicholson, op. cit. (14), vol. 1, p. 720.
103 Kirwan, op. cit. (7), p. 8.
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efﬁcacy, that, without the former, the whole effect cannot be appreciated. In natural
philosophy, no observations are trivial, no truths insigniﬁcant.104
The chemical subject matter is essentially complex, hence chemical knowledge cannot be
reductive. Chemistry requires immediate recognition of the different substances in their
different states and stages. Not a ‘false shew of simplicity’ but a close acquaintance
with substances that allows the discernment of uniformities and regularities within
the complexity. This was the kind of interpretation of principles and properties that the
defence of phlogiston strived to preserve. Priestley, the last major chemist to engage
actively in this defence, was perhaps the most eloquent in characterizing the type of
uniformity that traditional chemistry offered, and how it was phlogiston that embodied
the unique balance between uniformity and diversity, between ‘differences’ and ‘known
laws’, which formed the foundation of chemical knowledge:
Some philosophers dislike the term phlogiston; but, for my part, I can see no objections to
giving that, or any other name, to a real something, the presence or absence of which makes so
remarkable a difference in bodies . . . and which may be transferred from one substance to
another, according to certain known laws, that is, in certain deﬁnite circumstances. It is
certainly hard to conceive how any thing that answers to this description can be only a mere
quality, or mode of bodies, and not a substance itself, though incapable of being exhibited
alone. At least, there can be no harm in giving this name to any thing, or any circumstance, that
is capable of producing these effects. If it should hereafter appear not to be a substance, we may
change our phraseology, if we think proper . . . When I use the term phlogiston, as a principle in
the constitution of bodies, I cannot mislead myself or others, because I use one and the same
term to denote only one and the same unknown cause of certain well-known effects.105
Just as the emanating ‘smell’ signalled the indubitable presence of ‘something’ –
a substantial chemical agent of sorts, for which ‘the term phlogiston’was as ﬁtting as any
other – so the very same ‘thing’, Priestley claimed, cannot be ‘a mere quality, or mode of
bodies’. Its presence and nature are inferred from relations between qualities or chemical
‘circumstance[s]’, which derive from experiments and experiences. It must be a
‘substance’, and as such an integral part of the material realm, the ultimate subject of
chemical knowledge.
Conclusion
When Kirwan and Priestley, Bergman and St John, Nicholson, Cavendish, and even
Fourcroy attempted to save phlogiston in the 1780s and 1790s, and into the 1800s, it
was not a particular hypothesis concerning combustion, calcination or respiration that
they were defending. They were all well aware that the term ‘phlogiston’ had already
gone through too many changes to designate any one substance or principle and they did
not fail to appreciate the achievements of the new chemistry. Their defence of phlogiston
was, rather, a defence of a chemistry they felt was about to vanish. This chemistry
compiled a close and broad acquaintance with the world of matter in all its complexity.
Its practitioners came to view this complexity as essential to matter: matter comprised
104 Bergman, op. cit. (31), p. xxxiii.
105 Priestley, op. cit. (8), pp. 282–283; italics in original.
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particular substances, each carrying unique properties, related to each other in a variety
of ways. This complexity embedded uniformities and regularities, but could not be
reduced to the universal bulk and force which the new chemistry imported from physics.
Proper chemical inquiry had to pay full attention to the various causal interactions and
their manifestations; it could not be reduced to the measurement and comparison of
weight.
Afﬁnity to oxygen was a useful and convincing generalization characterizing all
combustible and inﬂammable bodies. Like any chemical property, however, it required a
chemical cause, which in turn had to be embodied by a substance, ‘the absolute
existence’ of which we must allow, whether, as St John observed, ‘we call it phlogiston,
caloric, or in plain English, ﬁre’.
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